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RECENT
MARYLAND DECISIONS
by Jack Elsby

REBUTTAL EVIDENCE:
ORDER OF PROOF
In Hepple v. State, 31 Md. App. 525,
358 A.2d 283 (1976), the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals carefully defined the scope of the trial judge's discretion concerning that which is admissible
as rebuttal evidence.
Chief Judge Orth, speaking for the
court, noted that the usual order of proof
was for the state to present its evidence
in its case in chief, followed by the defense's attempt to establish absence of
guilt, and culminating in the state's rebuttal. However, the "mere order of
proof and under what circumstances
evidence should be admitted or rejected
when offered out of proper order" is
clearly within the sound discretion of the
trial court. In the rebuttal stage of the
trial, therefore, the judge enjoys two discretions: (1) to permit the moving party
to reopen its case to introduce evidence
adducible in chief, and (2) to determine
whether evidence offered to rebut is
truly rebuttal evidence.
Evidence adducible in chief is evidence essential to a conviction, whereas
rebuttal evidence includes "' ... any
competent evidence which explains, or
is a direct reply to, or a contradiction of,
any new matter that has been brought
into the case by the defense' " [d. at 530,
358 A.2d at 287 (emphasis added).
Therefore, statements of evidence adducible in chief are clearly distinct and
separable from rebuttal evidence, and
while it is within the trial judge's discretion to admit evidence adducible in chief
in the rebuttal stage of the trial, the judge
cannot admit such evidence "as rebuttal". To do so would be an abuse of the
trial judge's discretion as to what constiphoto by Chris Michael

tutes rebuttal evidence and would be
grounds for reversal where the admission is manifestly wrong and substantially injurious to the defendant.

NEGLIGENCE: LIABILITY OF
LANDLORD FOR CRIMINAL
ACTIVITIES OF THIRD PARTIES
In Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359
A.2d 548 (1976), decedent's widow and
personal representative brought a
wrongful death action claiming defendant landlord breached a duty owed to
decedent tenant Scott to protect him
from criminal acts of third parties committed in common areas under the landlord's control, and that such breach was
the proximate cause of Scott's death.
Decedent Scott, who was a resident of
a two hundred and ninety unit urban
apartment complex, was killed by a
shotgun blast in the apartment's underground garage. This was the first act of
personal harm to come to the landlord's
attention, but he knew there was a high
incidence of crime in the surrounding
area. The landlord also knew that over a
one and a half year period some of the
tenants' apartments had been
burglarized, their automobiles had been
stolen from in front of the apartment,
and on one occasion an employee of
one of the retail shops had been robbed
and raped. While the landlord was instituting new security procedures at the
time of Scott's murder, he had already
installed extensive personnel and
mechanical security.
The court considered three questions:
(1) Does Maryland law impose upon
the landlord of an urban apartment
complex a duty to tenants to protect
them from the criminal acts of third
parties committed in common areas
within the landlord's control, and, if
so, what is the extent of such duty?
(2) If no duty exists generally, would
such a duty be imposed if the landlord has knowledge of increasing
criminal activity on the premises or
in the surrounding neighborhood?
(3) Would such a duty be imposed
upon a landlord if such landlord has
undertaken specific measures to
protect his tenants from criminal acts
of third parties?

The court answered the first issue in
the affirmative, but refused to apply a
special duty standard of care used in
common carrier-passenger cases.
Rather, the court held that the landlord
of urban apartment complexes must
exercise reasonable care for the tenants'
safety in common areas within the landlord's control, and that to require a
greater standard of care would put a
landlord' 'perilously close to the position
of insurer of the tenants' safety." [d. at
167, 359 A.2d at 553.
In considering the second question,
the court found that if the landlord
knows, or should have known, of criminal activity against persons or property in
the common areas, he has a duty to take
reasonable measures to eliminate the
conditions contributing to the criminal
activity. The court indicated that since
the landlord can affect the risk only
within his own premises, then only criminal acts occuring on the landlord's
premises, and of which he knows or
should have known, constitute relevant
factors in determining whether the landlord exercised reasonable care.
In answering the third question, the
court noted that even if no duty existed
to employ a particular level of security on
the landlord's part, his improper performance of such a voluntary act could,
in particular circumstances, constitute a
breach of duty.
Finally, in considering whether the
landlord's breach of the duty of reasonable care is the proximate cause of a tenant's injuries suffered at the hands of
third parties, the court found that the
breach by the landlord would result in
liability only if the breach enhanced the
likelihood of the particular criminal activity which occurred.

by H. Jerome Fenzel
and Milton Baxley

BRUTON DISTINGUISHED
In Brooks & Brooks v. State, 32 Md.
App. 116, 359 A.2d 217 (1976), the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals held

that errors committed in admitting the
confessions of co-defendants, because
of Bruton v. United States, 341 U.S. 123
(1968), were cured when each defendant took the stand and subjected himself to cross-examination. While Bruton
held that, in a joint trial, the admission of
a non-testifying co-defendant's extrajudicial confession implicating the defendant violated the right to confrontation,
the need for applying the rule is negated
when the co-defendant takes the stand
and subjects himself to crossexamination by the defendant's attorney.

CRIMINAL APPEAL DE NOVO
MUST BE TRIED BASED UPON
SAME CHARGING DOCUMENTS
In Pinkett v. State, 30 Md. App. 458,
352 A.2d 358 (1976), the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals held that an
appeal to the Circuit Court of a criminal
case tried in the District Court must be
heard on the same charging documents.
Pinkett was convicted in the District
Court on the strength of a statement of
charges and an arrest warrant. The Circuit Court tried him on the two previous
charges plus two new charges. The
Court remanded the two previous
charges back to the District Court for
retrial on the original charging documents. As to the new charges, based on
a newly filed information, it was proper
for the Circuit Court to try the defendant,
even though the charges which had
been an issue in the District Court had to
be retried.
In determining this point, the court distingUished this case from the holding of
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
There, the Supreme Court held that
after a jury determined that the accused
was not one of the robbers involved, the
state could not relitigate the same issue
at a second trial. The court of special appeals stated that Ashe "does not stand
for the proposition that where the accused is convicted of one crime he may
not be prosecuted for another crime arising out of the same factual circumstances." Pinkett, supra at 472-73,
352 A.2d 367-68.

SEIZURE OF HEROIN IN
"ABANDONED" WASTE UPHELD
WHERE THERE WAS NO
INTRUSION INTO THE
DEFENDANT'S BODY
In Venner v. State, 30 Md. App. 599,
354 A.2d 483 (1976), the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals held that it is
not an illegal search or seizure when
police come into possession of contraband, instrumentalities or fruits of
crime, or mere evidence without violating the security of the defendant's person or his house or other constitutionally
protected area. Here, the police, after
being called by a nurse, retrieved balloons containing hashish oil from the
defendant's bedpan. The court determined that Venner neither exercised or
attempted to exercise any disposition or
control over the waste, and had no expectation of privacy with respect to the
disposition of his waste. Once the balloons were deposited in the bedpan,
they were abandoned property.
The Court distinguished People v.
Bracamonte, 15 Cal. 3d 394, 540 P.2d
624, 124 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1975), where,
pursuant to a search warrant, police arrested the defendant, took her to the
hospital, and ordered her stomach
pumped. When the defendant resisted,
she was strapped to the table and a tube
was passed through her nose. Finally,
she gave up and regurgitated balloons
containing heroin. The court noted that
in that case the intrusion was more than
minor and the facts of the case constituted a condition other than the
emergency condition present in
Schmerber v. Califomia. 384 U.S. 757
(1966). The court noted that Venner
was never confronted by the police and
that there was no intrusion into his body.
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF
REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL
UPHELD
In James v. State, 31 Md. App. 666,
358 A.2d 595 (1976), the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals held that a violation of the principle enunciated in
Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967),
was not reversible error where the court
on appeal could take judicial notice of
the fact that the Supreme Bench of Bal-

timore City, in 1963, assigned counsel to
all felony cases and the docket entries
disclosed that the defendant was represented by counsel. There a parole order
was admitted into evidence by the trial
court without establishing that the parole
resulted from a trial at which the defendant was represented by counselor
knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel. The court pointed to the fact that it
could take notice of a matter, in this case,
which was part of the public record in an
effort to maintain judicial economy, despite Fletcher v. Floumey, 198 Md. 53,
81 A.2d 232 (1951), which stated that
the "court will not travel outside the record in order to take notice of proceedings unless put into evidence." [d. at 60,
81 A.2d at 235.

LIMITATIONS UPON STATE'S USE
OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR
CONVICTIONS WHEN
QUESTIONING CHARACTER
WITNESS
In Taylor v. State, 360 A.2d 430
(1976), the Maryland Court of Appeals
held that it was reversible error to permit
the prosecution to cross-examine the defense's character witnesses about the defendant's prior convictions without any
prior introduction of the convictions.
The court felt that what was impermissible in the questioning of the defendant
should also be impermissible in the
examination of character witnesses.
The court avoided reaching the question whether three recent Supreme
Court decisions have tempered the holding of Michaelson v. United States, 335
U.S. 469 (1948). In Michaelson, the
Supreme Court held that a character
witness for a criminal defendant might
be cross-examined as to an arrest of the
defendant, whether or not that arrest resulted in a conviction. The recent cases,
however, stand for the proposition that
constitutionally firm convictions can not
be used to support the guilt of the defendant, Loper v. Belo, 405 U.S. 473
(1972), enhance his punishment, United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972),
or impeach his credibility, Burgett v.
Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967). In this case,
the error was harmless and did not

prejudice the defendant, in view of the
overwhelming evidence of his guilt.
by John Crabbs
NEW LIGHT ON VICARIOUS
LIABILITY
The recent decision of the Maryland
Court of Appeals in Mabe v. B.P. Oil
Corp., 31 Md. App. 221,356 A.2d 304
(1976), if allowed to stand, may open a
broad new area of vicarious liability in
Maryland law. The Maryland Court of
Appeals granted certiorari and oral argument was heard on November 5,
1976. B.P. Oil Corp. v. Mabe, No. 43,
Sept. Term, 1976.
Claude Mabe, while driving, pulled
into a B.P. station and asked the attendant for water for his radiator. He was
given a can which contained not water,
but some other liquid, which when
spilled on the hot engine, exploded and
injured Mabe. It was not disputed that
the injury was the result of the negligence of the station attendant who gave
him the can. The only issue was
whether B.P. Corporation was vicariously liable for the negligence.
After a jury verdict for Mabe, the trial
judge, upon proper motion, entered a
judgment n.o.v. for B.P. Mabe appealed
on the grounds that there was sufficient
evidence to present a jury question,
"either of the existence of an actual
agency relationship between B.P. and
the station operator, or of an apparent
agency based on manifestation thereof
by B.P., upon which appellant relied."
[d. at 226, 356 A.2d at 308.
It is settled under Maryland law that
vicarious liability for torts of an agent
exists only if that agent is a servant. Gallagher's Estate v. Battle, 209 Md. 592,
122 A.2d 93 (1956). Thus it must be assumed that the grounds of appeal are the
existence of a jury question as to the
applicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior by estoppel.
From the facts, there appears little difficulty in finding sufficient evidence for a
jury question as to the existence of a
master-servant relationship. On that
point the inquiry is whether B.P. had the
right of control over the station manager
in respect to the work to be performed.

See State ex reI. Bozango v.
Blumenthal-Kahn Elec. Co., 162 Md.
84,159 A. 106 (1932).

Facts of the case relevant to this question are: (1) the station manager was
paid through a reciprocal lease agreement on commissions for fuel sold, (2)
he was not permitted, by agreement, to
use the premises for repair or maintenance of automobiles, (3) he was not allowed to affix any sign, fixture or device
to the station without permission from
B.P., and (4) the court suggests that
there was coercion by the company to
force the manager to accept "suggestions" of a sales representative.
The court suggests insulation of the
company from the manager by means of
a reciprocal lease agreement, but this is
not convincing. The cases cited in support of this proposition are not totally
apposite. In all of the cases used by the
court on this point, the lease agreement
was only one of the factors looked at,
and the main discussion of the lease provisions centered around liability of owners or possessors of land and not the
issue of master-servant relation.
Rather than take the direct conventional route to the imposition of liability,
the court resorted to the "emerging doctrine" of the "apparent servant". Mabe,
supra at 233,357 A.2d at 312. This doctrine as stated by the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §267 (1957)
is:
One who represents that another is his
servant or other agent and thereby
causes a third person to rely upon the
care or skill of such apparent agent is
subject to liability to the third person
for harm caused by the lack of care or
skill of the one appearing to be the
servant or other agent as if he were
such.
The broad extension of the law is not in
accepting this statement as the law in
Maryland, but in the meager facts required as the basis of representing that
another is his servant.
In considering the question, it is
necessary to set aside those facts mentioned above with respect to the existence of an actual master-servant relationship, as these are not representations
to Mabe. The existence of actual and
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apparent master-servant relationships
are two distinct questions which must be
carefully separated.
The facts which were the basis of the
apparent master-servant representations were: (1) a large B.P. sign at
the station, (2) the B.P. trademark on the
oil cans, the pumps and "everything"
including the attendant's uniforms. The

court also noted B.P.'s national and regional sales campaigns, as well as advertising on T.V. and in periodicals and the
yellow pages. The dissenting opinion
states, however, that there was no evidence of either the contents of this advertising, nor that the plaintiff had any
awareness of its existence. Without
awareness, Mabe certainly could not

have relied on these facts as representative of the existence of the masterservant relation.
If the Maryland Court of Appeals, in its
consideration of the issue, accepts the
apparent servant basis of liability in the
case, the court would do well to give
some definite indication of the scope of
such liability.

A Farewell
to Arms
by Len Moodispaw

For years gun advocates have been
quoting the second amendment to support their claim that the Constitution
gives Americans the right to bear arms.
However, constitutional scholars have
recently discovered evidence that may
throw the National Rifle Association into
disarray. It is the diary of one of the authors of the Bill of Rights, written at the
time that the first ten amendments were
being drafted. We were fortunate
enough to get a peek at that diary and an
exerpt follows:
Circa 1789
Went to dinner with Madison, Mason
and Adams. We felt like celebrating because we finished drafting the second
amendment. ltfinally read that a militia is
needed for national security and the
Government could call on people to
serve if needed.
Hamilton wanted to add a phrase
about everybody having the right to
keep knives, guns, or any weapons they
wanted. We hooted him out of the room.
We could not imagine letting everyone
run around with guns. Our soldiers
drove General Washington crazy during
the war. He claims we shot more of our
own men than the Redcoats did! In one
battle we had 14 casualties and that was
before the British arrived!
We were talking about the logistical
problems we were encountering in getphoto by Chris Michael

